Experience organised by concepts - relevant science?

It seems like experience is organised by the abstract concepts or categories that we know – the more we know, the more we perceive. The world is an undifferentiated whole, and we use concepts and categories to make sense of it in a way that seems pre-rational and not necessarily entirely verbal, but for sure to a high degree facilitated by language. Where my daughter sees "a bunch of guitars", I see one electrical bass, two stratocasters, one telecaster, one semi-hollow ES-335 copy, one acoustic and one classical guitar.

I think most people have the experience that as we learn something new, suddenly we see things in the world that we didn’t see before. We have learned a new way of looking at the world, of organising our sensory input into new categories, and we therefore see things that we couldn’t see before.

I have no doubt that this phenomenon has been studied extensively in cognitive science, and I would like some references for where I could read more about this. I’m interested in the way that our concepts influence our experience and how this leads to habits that make us take our concepts as truth.

My main purpose is to use such scientific literature to support an argument that diagnostic categories in psychiatry aren’t "true" (i.e. natural categories) even if they "feel" true to us clinicians (I work as a psychiatrist), because as least to some extent, they’re the result of having been socialised into a certain way of organising our clinical experience.