"To include" vs. "including"

Having also seen the example given, I decided to look at the pdf given by CNN; as it turns out, they seem to use "to include" throughout where "including" might normally be seen. An example:

In meetings between tlie [sic] Committee Staff and the CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain tlie [sic] details of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's presence at COBALT.

I can see the ambiguity here where "unable" might affect "to include" (although I think it doesn't) so I'll give another example:

I recall vividly watching the horror of that day, to include the television footage of innocent men and women jumping out of the World Trade Center towers to escape the fire. The images, and the sounds as their bodies hit the pavement far below, will remain with me for the rest of my life.

The phrase "to include" is used 58 times in the pdf of the report according to the search function, though not all represent the kind of usage we are discussing. While it appears to be a subordinate clause fragment of sorts (I may be wrong on the technical labeling), I'm suspicious that it might be an esoteric formality because of its repeated instance in the report.

Infinitives and gerunds are sometimes used interchangeably; sometimes it works, and sometimes not. They are not the same.

Saying "You are to include waterboarding" is not the same as saying "You are including waterboarding." Saying "I am swimming with the team" is not the same as saying "I am to swim with the team."

The infinitive should represent an intention or an instruction. The gerund should represent the actual occurrence. Of course we mix them up sometimes and it is usually not an issue. If we look at the sentences before and after, there is generally no ambiguity. That said, the sentence in the example is awkward, and in my opinion it is wrong to use the infinitive.

In this case I believe it is a clumsy attempt at rhetoric. By not "doing", but instead listing "to do," the sentence tries to disengage from the action and make it appear somehow separated from the subject of the torture.

Piling on to what others have already said, I would argue that the usage here is flat wrong. There is an implied tense mismatch at work ... when you use the infinite form "to include" with a list of items, you are implying future composition of those items, which may or may not come to pass. Since all of these cases reference past events explicitly, such an implication is inherently non-sensical, therefore only the use of the gerund form "including" is acceptable.

I agree with the suspicion expressed in another answer that this was likely an attempt at a rhetorical device to distance the authors of the report from the events described.

I agree wholeheartedly with the other answers here, but I have a few other notes to add (referring to the points below). BTW, I sourced the original PDF file from wikisource and the Senate.

Unfortunately, I have been unable to find the report in HTML format, only as an unwieldy 66MB PDF.

Duplications

Duplications are denoted by "DD".

There are 16 duplications (with point 19 being the original) of

and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")

• Point 15 is a duplication of point 14.
• Point 16 is a duplication of point 12.
• Point 33 is a duplication of point 32.
• Point 47 is a duplication of point 41.

so really there are about 45 different uses of to include.

Other Notes

• Point 57 just sounds plain wrong.
• A number (about 6) are actual valid uses of to include (denoted by !!) namely points 9, 17, 18, 52, 53, and 56.
• Note that including is used on a few occasions, in the same sentence as to include, which makes it harder to understand why to include is prolific throughout the report. In fact, the word including appears 354 times in the report (although some 40-odd of those are duplicates)

I have listed below the 65 examples of "to include" (the figure in the parentheses is the page number of the PDF - rather than the page number of the sub-document contained within the PDF):

1. Page 1/5 (2) - I recall vividly watching the horror of that day, to include the television footage of innocent men and women jumping out of the World Trade Center towers to escape the fire.
2. Page 5/5 (6) - From early 2009 to late 2012, a small group of Committee staff reviewed the more than six million pages of CIA materials, to include operational cables, intelligence reports, internal memoranda and emails, briefing materials, interview transcripts, contracts,and other records.
3. Page 4/19 (11) - CIA officers also threatened at least three detainees with harm to their families— to include threats to harm the children of a detainee, threats to sexually abuse the mother of a detainee, and a threat to "cut [a detainee's] mother's throat.
4. Page 13/19 (20) - There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the reviews independently validated the "effectiveness" claims presented by the CIA, to include basic confirmation that the intelligence cited by the CIA was acquired from CIA detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques.
5. Page 14/19 (21) - Significant events, to include the death and injury of CIA detainees, the detention of individuals who did not meet the legal standard to be held, the use of unauthorized interrogation techniques against CIA detainees, and the provision of inaccurate information on the CIA program did not result in appropriate, effective, or in many eases, any corrective actions.
6. Page 8/499 (34) - This volume addresses the detention and interrogation of 119 CIA detainees, from the program's authorization on September 17, 2001, to its official end on January 22, 2009, to include information on their capture, detention, interrogation, and conditions of confinement.
7. Page 9/499 (35 - )The second part provides information on the effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and InteiTogation Program, to include information acquired from CIA detainees, before, during, and after the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques; as well as CIA representations on the effectiveness and operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program to the media, the Department of Justice, and the Congress.
8. Page 18/499 (44) - In1978,DCI Stansfield Turner asked former CIA officer John Limond Hart to investigate the CIA interrogation of Soviet KGB officer Yuri Nosenko"^^using the KUBARK methods—to include sensory deprivation techniques and forced standing."^
9. !! Page 20/499 (47) - The only research documented in CIA records during this time on the issue of interrogation was the preparation of a report on an al-Qa'ida manual that was initially assessed by the CIA to include strategies to resist interrogation.
10. Page 25/499 (51) - Abu Zubaydah told the FBI officers that "Mukhtar" trained the 9/11 hijackers and also provided additional information on KSM's background, to include that KSM spoke fluent English, was approximately 34 years old, and was responsible for al-Qa'ida operations outside of Afghanistan.
11. Page 44/499 footnote (70) - This passage was included in multiple emails, to include emails from the ||^^|OMS,
12. Page 51/499 footnote (77) - In meetings between the Committee Staff and the CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain the details of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's presence at COBALT
13. Page 53/499 (79) - On August 5, 2002, the day after Abu Zubaydah's interrogation using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques at DETENTION SITE GREEN began, CIA Headquarters authorized the proposed interrogation plan for al-Najjar, to include the use of loud music (at less than the level that would cause physical harm such as permanent hearing loss), worse food (as long as it was nutritionally adequate for sustenance), sleep deprivation, and hooding.^
14. Page 76/499 (102) - Those CIA officers wrote that bin al-Shibh had provided information used in approximately 50 CIA intelligence reports, including information on potential future threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow Airport an^^Nashiri's planning for potential operations in the Arabian Peninsula.
15. DD Page 79/499 footnote (105) - future threats, to include a potential attack on London's Heathrow airport and al-Nashiri's planning for potential operations in the Arabian Peninsula.
16. DD Page 106/499 footnote (132) - In meetings between the Committee staff and the CIA in the summer of 2013, the CL was unable to explain the details of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the waterboard's presence at DETENTION SITE COBALT.
17. !! Page 170/499 (196) - On December 5,2007,fewer than nine months after Director Hayden told the European Union that the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program was not a CIA program, but "America's program," the House-Senate conference for the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act voted to include an amendment that banned coercive interrogation techniques and established the Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations as the interrogation standard for all U.S. government interrogations.
18. !! Page 172/499 footnote (198) - These representations were also made by the CIA to other elements of the executive branch, to include the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
19. Page 173/499 footnote (199) - (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta, entitled, "Tab 9: DCIA Briefing on RDI Program-18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Klialid Shaykli Muhammad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
20. DD Page 174/499 footnote (200) - The documents include "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted."
21. DD Page 177/499 footnote (203) - (See CIA briefing documents for Leon Panetta,entitled,"Tab9:DCIA Briefing on RDI Program- 18FEB.2009" and graphic attachment, "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and Khaiid Shaykli Muhaimnad (KSM)," including "DCIA Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "EITs and Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include "Background on Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
22. Page 193/499 footnote (219) - The information forwarded by stated that, "subsequent to the application of enhanced measures," the CIA "learned more in-depth details" about operational planning, "to include ongoing operations against both the US and Saudi interests in Saudi Arabia."
23. Page 206/499 footnote (232) - See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume IE, to include CIA email [REDACTED] dated March 28, 2007, 04:42 PM, with the subject line, "Subject detainee allegation - per our telcon of today."
24. DD Page 209/499 footnote (235) - Briefing on RDI Program" agenda, CIA document "ElTs and Effectiveness," with associated documents, "Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment (AZ and KSM)," "Background on Key Intelligence Impacts Chart: Attachment," and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
25. DD Page 219/499 footnote (245) - and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
26. DD Page 223/499 footnote (249) - and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
27. DD Page 224/499 footnote (250) - and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
28. DD Page 228/499 footnote (254) - and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
29. Page 231/499 footnote (257) - See intelligence chronology in Volume II, to include: (1) email from: [REDACTED]^^^^ ^BBOTA/CTWG/CBRN Group; to: [REDACTED] and multiple ccs, including subject: "Re: [REDACTED]: Re: KSM homework on AQ nuke program"; date: April 22, 2003, at 03:30 PM, explaining CIA's CBRN group's position on Padilla and Mohammed's plotting; "Padilla and Binyam/Zouaoui had pulled an article off a satirical web site called 'How to make an H-bomb' which is based on a 1979 Journal of Irreproducible Results article.
30. Page 232/499 (258) - "Al-Muhajir's" form—dated July 24, 2000—listed other identifying information, to include a "10/18/70" date of birth; language skills to include English, Spanish, and Arabic; travels to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen; and the individual's marital status.
31. Page 232/499 (258) - "Al-Muhajir's" form—dated July 24, 2000—listed other identifying information, to include a "10/18/70" date of birth; language skills to include English, Spanish, and Arabic; travels to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen; and the individual's marital status.
32. Page 232/499 (258) - See also numerous open source articles, to include, "CIA Officer Testifies He Was Given Qaeda 'Pledge Form' Said to be Padilla's," New York Times, dated May 16, 2007;
33. DD Page 233/499 (259) - See also numerous open source articles, to include, "CIA Officer Testifies He Was Given Qaeda 'Pledge Form' Said to be Padilla's," New York Times, dated May 16, 2007;
34. Page 238/499 (264) - The form was found to have Jose Padilla's fingerprints, as well as identifying data to include his date of birth, languages spoken, and travels.
35. Page 238/499 (264) - See open sources, to include press articles such as, "Court Says Padilla Prison Sentence Too Lenient," Reuters, dated September 19, 2011.
36. 239/499 (265) - The Karachi Plot(s) refers to terrorist plotting that targeted a variety of U.S. and Western interests in the Karachi area, to include the U.S. Consulate, named hotels near the airport and beach, U.S. vehicles traveling between the Consulate and the airport, U.S. diplomatic housing, U.S. personnel subject to potential sniper attacks, as well as Pakistan's Faisal Army Base.
37. DD Page 241/499 footnote (267) - and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
38. Page 242/499 (268) - A review of CIA operational cables and other documents found that the CIA*s enhanced interrogation techniques—to include the waterboard—played no role in the disruption of the Karachi Plot(s).
39. Page footnote 248/499 (274) - See also KSM and Hambali reporting from October 2003, and the intelligence chronology in Volume II, to include [REDACTED] 45915 (141431Z SEP 03).
40. DD Page 250/499 footnote (276) - and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
41. Page 259/499 footnote (285) - According to Sajid Badat,"anyone who had been involved with jihad in Britain since the mid-90s" would know Issa al-Hindi (aka Dhiren Barot), to include Babar Alimed, Moazzem Begg, Richard Reid, Zacarias Moussaoui, and KSM.
42. DD Page 263/499 footnote (289) - and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
43. DD Page 263/499 footnote (289) - and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
44. DD Page 263/499 footnote (289) - and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
45. DD Page 268/499 footnote (304) - and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
46. DD Page 269/499 footnote (305) - and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
47. DD Page 285/499 footnote (311) - According to Sajid Badat,"anyone who had been involved with jihad in Britain since the mid-90s" would know Issa al-Hindi (aka Dhiren Barot), to include Babar Alimed, Moazzem Begg, Richard Reid, Zacarias Moussaoui, and KSM.
48. DD Page 287/499 footnote (313) - and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
49. DD Page 296/499 footnote (322) - and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
50. Page 298/499 footnote (324) - For example, prior to receiving any information from CIA detainees, the CIA acquired detailed information about al-Qa'ida's targeting of Heathrow Airport, to include, but not limited to, the al-Qa'ida senior leaders involved, the method of the planned attack, the status of the operation, and the kunyas of two potential unwitting operatives in the UnitedKingdom.
51. DD Page 303/499 footnote (329) - and "supporting references," to include Background Key Captures and Plots Disrupted.")
52. !! Page 311/499 (337) - The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "our review showed that the Study failed to include examples of important information acquired from detainees that CIA cited more frequently and prominently in its representations than several of the cases the authors chose to include."
53. !! Page 311/499 (337) - The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "our review showed that the Study failed to include examples of important information acquired from detainees that CIA cited more frequently and prominently in its representations than several of the cases the authors chose to include."
54. Page 314/499 (340) - On September 12, 2001, a foreign government source, described as a member of al-Qa'ida, stated "the 11 September attacks had been masterminded from Kabul by three people," to include "Shaykh Khalid," who was related to Ramzi Yousef.^
55. Page 338/499 footnote (364) - The attachment to the document, labeled "points from CTC," further asserts that while CIA rendition activities "did yield intelligence, it did not do so in a timely, efficient, and thorough way, raising unacceptable risks," and that the CIA "experience has shown that exclusive control by CIA, in a Agency designed, built, and managed facility, allows us complete oversight and control over all aspects of detention, to include conditions of confinement, approved interrogation activities, humane standards, medical treatment, detainee engagement, security, hygiene, and infrastructure."
56. !! Page 340/499 (366) - Neither the detention of Guleed, nor the information he provided, thwarted terrorist plotting against Camp Lemonier; and CIA records indicate that attack planning against Camp Lemonier continued well after Guleed's capture in March 2004, to include a time period beyond the president's September6, 2006, speech.
57. Page 380/499 (406) - Nonetheless,by the end of 2002,the CIA was actively targeting Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and had collected significant reporting on Abu Ahmad al- Kuwaiti—to include reporting on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's close links to UBL.
58. Page 382/499 (408) - On June 5, 2002, the CIA received reporting from a detainee in the custody of a foreign government indicating that "Abu Ahmad" was one of tiiree al-Qa'ida associated individuals—to include Sa'ad bin Ladin and KSM—who visited him.
59. Page 384/499 (410) - While CIA detainees eventually did provide some information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti beginning in the spring of 2003, the majority of the accurate intelligence acquired on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was collected outside of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, either from detainees not in CIA custody, or from other intelligence sources and methods unrelated to detainees, to include human sources and foreign partners.^
60. Page 387/499 (413) - As detailed in CIA records, and acknowledged by the CIA in testimony, information from CIA detainees subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—to include CIA detainees who had clear links to Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti based on a large body of intelligence reporting—provided fabricated, inconsistent, and generally unreliable information on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti throughout their detention.
61. Page 392/499 (418) - The fourth, Abu Zubaydah, who was detained on March 28, 2002, and subjected to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques in August 2002, to include the waterboard technique, did not provide information on Abu Ahmad al- Kuwaiti until August 25, 2005, intelligence that was described by CIA officers at the time as "speculative."
62. Page 448/499 (474) - February 14, 2007, during a hearing on CIA renditions. Director Hayden provided inaccurate information to the Committee, to include inaccurate information on the number of detainees held by the CIA.
63. Page 478/499 (504) - Prior to July 20, 2007, in the case of at least six CIA detainees, the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was nonetheless predicated on the assessment that the detainees possessed "locational information" on senior HVTs, to include UBL or Ayman al-Zawahiri.
64. Page 479/499 (505) - The CIA consistently represented that the interrogation of CIA detainees using the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques resulted in critical and otherwise unavailable intelligence that led to the capture of specific terrorists, to include, among others: KSM, Majid Khan, Ramzi bin al- Shibh, lyman Paris, Saleh al-Marri, Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash, Sajid Badat, and Dhiren Barot.^
65. Page 498/499 (524) - CIA records indicate that multiple detainees were shackled with their hands above their heads at other CIA detention sites. For example, see detainee reviews in Volume IK, to include 'Abdal-Rahimal-Nashiri,^^^^ Hassan Ghul,^^^® and According to CIA cables, Abu Zubaydah was handcuffed "high on the bars."

Yes, it was incorrect to say "to include" rather than "including".

This error is almost universal among U.S. military officers. Most of them say "to include" in every single case where they should say "including". Every time. And this has been true for at least the last three decades.

I have no idea how this started, but it is easy to imagine a folk etymology for it. You could imagine a general giving the order "you are to take this and to include these". The recipient of the order is unclear on proper grammar, and so later replies with "I took that, to include those". And somehow the error spread.

I don't know if that is the actual cause of this error. But it is true that the infinitive is appropriate for giving orders, and the military often deals with orders. And it is true that this error is now firmly entrenched in the common speech patterns of that community.

It is my educated guess that "to include" has crept into government speech, especially military speech, as an artifact of government contracting--the infinitive form is frequently used in work breakdown structures, performance work statements, and other contractual lists of tasks. People used to reading, responding to, and evaluating compliance with and completion of requirements have become inured to that phrase, and erroneously use it when they mean "including."

As a civilian editor who works for the Army, I see this way more than in that report. My own take on it (based on hearing people say it, almost daily) is that it is meant in the sense of a command. But as an indefinite infinitive, it is far less inclusive than "including," because it leaves open the possibility of might include and might not include. I eradicate it from everything I edit that has it in it and patiently explain to the writer that it's simply wrong. But it's not just the military. It's used throughout government. There are many others: vice when the meaning is versus or as opposed to; careerist when the meaning is someone in a career (really). "The art of the possible" when the meaning is not compromise, but the sky is the limit. The list goes on and on.

I'm no expert by any means, but the following makes sense in my head at least.

The phrase "to include" means to only use, review, or execute the list (or series of things) that come immediately after said phrase.

If you use "including" in the sentence, this would imply using, reviewing, and/or executing the item (or list of items) that came before and after the "including" insert.

I think it is simple. "To include" is prescriptive and forward-looking. "Including" is descriptive and purposefully disconnected with timing. I agree based on many years experience that "to include" is primarily a military usage based on giving instruction or orders.

Thanks to all for taking care to answer my question. Living in Uganda the 'net is often sporadic and moreover I am never informed of the activity my question(s) could have generated. In answer some people have said "to include" in place of "including" is plain wrong, yet admin has quoted from the Senate report where it has been used scores of times. Myself I am struck by its constant usage by the eminent columnist Philip Giraldi. It jars me, but there, it is there. It is like he wants his usage to pass into general usage. Once again, excuses for asking a question and leaving it there. I am going to go look up all my questions and comments made and do some comments myself.
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